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A B S T R A C T
We analyse all the major sources of direct and indirect research and development (R&D) support to the business
enterprise sector in a single country, Norway, for the period 2002–2013, treating the financial support for R&D
from several instruments as a multivariate dose exposure. The output additionality of support to incumbent firms
that regularly perform R&D (R&D-incumbents), which obtain about 65 per cent of all R&D support to business
enterprises, is insignificant for any instrument or policy mixture. However, the estimated additionality of sup-
port to R&D-starters (firms without prior R&D activity), which obtain about 30 per cent of all R&D support, is
generally positive. In this firm category, the main instruments for direct R&D support in Norway generate sig-
nificantly less output and economic activity per NOK 1 million in support than do tax credits, despite the fact
these instruments manage large project portfolios at considerable administrative costs. We do not identify po-
sitive effects of R&D support on labour productivity or the return on assets for any of the instruments. Our main
policy implication is that R&D instruments for the business enterprise sector should be designed in favour of R&
D-starters over R&D-incumbents, that is, shifting the focus from the intensive to the extensive margin.
1. Introduction
There is a general understanding among economists that technolo-
gical progress is closely linked to economic growth and that it is spurred
by investment in research and development (R&D) (e.g., see
Romer, 1990). Public support to private R&D is based on the notion that
there are market failures and spillovers related to R&D (e.g., see
Griliches, 1992). A common source of market failure is knowledge ex-
ternalities. Such externalities may occur if it is difficult to establish
ownership rights to new production methods or technologies, which
enables competitors to take advantage of investment in R&D without
bearing the costs.
The extent of public support to R&D has increased as a percentage of
gross domestic product in most OECD countries over the last 10 years
(see OECD, 2016, Fig. 4.7). However, the average gross domestic
spending on R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product in these
countries has been quite stable over 2000–2016, varying from 2.1 per
cent to 2.4 per cent.1 In this context, the goal of this paper is to evaluate
quantitatively the economic benefits of R&D subsidies on firms’ per-
formance, given that in most countries there are several co-existing and
potentially complementary R&D support schemes. We study a set of
outcome variables related to output, employment, labour productivity
(output per employee) and profitability. These outcome variables are
highly relevant from a policy perspective as the subsidy instruments
analysed are all intended to contribute to increased activity in R&D-
intensive industries.
This article contributes to the literature on output additionality of R
&D support to firms and to the small but growing literature on do-
se–response analysis.2 Although there are other studies that address the
issue of multiple sources of public R&D support (e.g., Czarnitzki and
Lopes-Bento, 2013, and Dumont, 2017), to the best of our knowledge,
there are no published articles that analyse all the major sources of R&D
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support in the business enterprise sector in a single country.3 Our do-
se–response framework treats financial R&D support as a multivariate
support-dose exposure, without making strong assumptions about the
effects of policy instrument mixtures (For example, we do not assume
that the instruments are perfect substitutes).
A major part of the existing literature on public R&D support analyses
(R&D) input additionality. The literature focusing on output additionality
or other outcome measures is much more limited.4 Bronzini and
Iachini (2014) and Bronzini and Piselli (2016) find positive effects on pa-
tenting of an R&D subsidy program in northern Italy, whereas
Cappelen et al. (2012) find that the introduction of R&D tax credits in
Norway contributed to an increase in (self-reported) new products and
processes, but not to more patent applications. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016)
find that tax deductions for R&D expenses in the UK increased the pro-
pensity to patent. Turning to other outcome measures, Bodas-
Freitas et al. (2017) find that R&D tax credit programs in Norway, France
and Italy have led to an increase in firms’ turnover from new products.
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2018) find that publicly induced R&D has a
positive effect on the output growth of German firms. Hottenrott and
Richstein (2020) also analyse German firms and find that grants and sub-
sidized loans facilitate tangible investment, employment and revenue
growth. Cin et al. (2017) find that a public R&D subsidy program in Korea
increased private R&D investments and labour productivity for small and
medium-sized firms (SMEs) in the manufacturing industry. Bérubé and
Mohnen (2009) find that the revenue from new products is higher for
subsidized than for non-subsidized Canadian firms. Using Canadian firm-
level data, Czarnitzki et al. (2011) find positive effects of R&D tax credits
on the number and sales of new products.
The main challenge in assessing the causal effects of R&D subsidy
programs is endogenous selection into the programs based on un-
observed or omitted variables that independently affect the outcome
variable (confounding factors). Often, selectivity issues are not empha-
sized in the literature on the effects of R&D support programs (see
Klette et al., 2000, and David et al., 2000). Our data have three unique
features that we exploit to address such issues: (1) we have full cov-
erage of limited liability firms receiving support over a relatively long
time (2002–2013); (2) the data on public support are merged with other
public registers that contain detailed information on accounting vari-
ables, employment and intellectual property rights (IP); and (3) the
register data are merged with survey data on firms’ R&D expenditures,
which enables us to track the R&D history prior to obtaining support for
more than 85 per cent of the firms that received any kind of public R&D
subsidies during the observation period.
Using panel data, we observe the outcome variables over time be-
fore and after support and compare them with a control group of firms
that did not receive any support, i.e., firms that are assumed to re-
present the non-treated (counterfactual) outcomes for those receiving
support. A sufficiently large treatment group and a large reference
population from which one can draw the control group are the neces-
sary conditions to distinguish systematic differences from spurious
correlations. Moreover, if the premises of the matching are met, the
estimated effect can be interpreted as a causal effect of the policy in-
struments among the firms that received support.
Defining R&D-experienced and R&D-starters as, respectively, firms
with and without R&D activity prior to receiving support, the findings
indicate the following. First, the estimated dose–responses of R&D
support tend to be positive and significant for R&D-starters, i.e. at the
extensive margin, but they are clearly insignificant for R&D-experienced
firms that were older than three years at the time of treatment as-
signment (henceforth referred to as R&D-incumbents). Second, our es-
timates are significant only for outcome variables related to growth in
output and employment, but insignificant with respect to labour pro-
ductivity and returns on assets. Third, we find that the effect of support
is decreasing on the margin, as the level of support per firm-year (the
support dose) increases. Fourth, despite managing large project portfo-
lios with considerable administrative costs, the major instruments for
direct support in Norway generate less additional output (value added)
and employment per NOK 1 million in support than do tax credits.
However, the comparatively positive effects regarding tax credits seem
to be due to lower levels of support dose, rather than to specific char-
acteristics of indirect vs. direct support.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 pre-
sents information about the institutional setting in Norway. Section 3
presents the data. Section 4 describes the matching procedure and the
general econometric model used for the analysis. Section 5 provides the
main results and discusses policy implications. Finally, Section 6 con-
cludes.
2. Institutional setting
Since 2002, the three main government instruments for promoting R
&D and innovation in the business enterprise sector in Norway have
been Innovation Norway (IN) and the Research Council of Norway
(RCN), which provide direct support, and the R&D tax credit scheme
Skattefunn (SKF), which provides indirect support. The goals and fi-
nancial means of these three instruments differ somewhat.
IN's activities can be broadly divided into three main activities or
programs: the innovation program, the district program and the lending
program. Our study covers only the innovation program, as the other
programs are not aimed at supporting R&D, but provide support to, for
example, agriculture and sparsely populated regions. The goal of the
innovation program is to promote profitable economic development by
supporting innovative businesses.5 The innovation program comprises
instruments such as grants, innovation loans, high-risk loans and ad-
visory services intended to promote new products, new technology,
organizational innovations and growth. IN is required by the govern-
ment to regularly provide impact assessments related to their activities,
including estimates of output additionality. Small start-up firms and
firms in specific technology areas (e.g., environmental technologies) are
targeted through designated grants and specialized programs. The total
support from IN's innovation program was NOK 1.1 billion in 2013.
Furthermore, by allocating support through regional offices, in contrast
to RCN and SKF, IN prioritizes an equal distribution of support across
the main regions of Norway.6
The support provided by RCN, like that from IN, involves a selective
instrument, with firms competing for funds.7 Support to the business
enterprise sector from RCN was NOK 1 billion in 2013. This represents
only about 20 per cent of all R&D support from RCN, as the main
beneficiaries are outside the business enterprise sector: Public and
3 There are a few (unpublished) reports and working papers that analyse the
same instruments as in our paper, including Bye et al. (2019),
Cappelen et al. (2016) and Hægeland and Møen (2007).
4 Some examples of the literature on input additionality are Wallsten (2000)
(U.S. firms), Duguet (2004) (French firms), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006)
(German firms), Lokshin and Mohnen (2013) (Dutch firms),
Cappelen et al. (2010) and Bøler et al. (2015) (Norwegian firms) and
Dumont (2017) (Belgian firms).
5 IN explains its goal as follows: ‘The main goal of Innovation Norway is to
promote profitable business and economic development in general, and to
promote the business opportunities in all regions through three subgoals: more
high-quality entrepreneurs, more growing companies and more innovative
business environments’ (translation based on Innovation Norway, 2018, p. 8).
6 See Cappelen et al. (2016), Table 3.5 and Fig. 3.3 (total amounts and re-
gional distribution, respectively).
7 The main argument for selective support schemes is that the government
can channel support to projects that are expected to have major positive ex-
ternal effects and, consequently, projects for which the social returns are higher
than private economic returns. For a theoretical basis for such project selection,
see Jaffe (1998).
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private (non-profit) research institutes received NOK 2.5 billion and the
university and higher education sector received NOK 2 billion in 2013.
RCN's support for the business enterprise sector does not specifically
target basic scientific research, but is aimed broadly at commercial R&D
that promote innovations and value creation for the supported firms.8
Through SKF, firms receive tax credits for R&D, comprising either
tax deductions or cash refunds if a firm's tax credits exceed its taxes.
SKF was introduced in 2002, originally to stimulate more SMEs to un-
dertake R&D. Its scope was expanded in 2003, to include all firms in the
business enterprise sector.9 From 2003, the SKF scheme granted large
firms (those with more than 100 employees) 18 per cent of R&D ex-
penses related to an approved project, up to a limit of NOK 4 million.
The rate for SMEs was 20 per cent of an approved project and, from
2009 to 2013, the maximum limit was NOK 5.5 million. Thus, the
maximum tax relief for a large firm was about NOK 1 million (about
EUR 110,000) in 2013.10 The tax refund is granted at the end of the
year in which the actual R&D expenses are incurred (assuming that the
project was approved).11 Total support from SKF was NOK 1.6 billion in
2013. In contrast to both IN and RCN, which select and actively manage
a portfolio of research projects, SKF supports R&D indiscriminately, with
minimal administrative costs. Each year about three-quarters of the
total tax subsidies are given as cash refunds, suggesting that liquidity is
the main motivation for applying for funds.12
An important difference between direct subsidies and tax credits is
that the latter are obtained by many more firms than the former but in
much smaller amounts per firm-year (one firm observed for one year).
This is illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows the distribution of support for
each scheme according to the amount of support per firm-year. For
example, more than 60 per cent of the SKF subsidies amount to less
than NOK 0.5 million per firm-year, compared with 35 per cent of IN
and 30 per cent of RCN subsidies. On the other hand, a significant share
of IN and RCN grants exceed NOK 6 million per year, and account for a
large share of the total support to firms from IN and RCN.13
The same firm may obtain support from several instruments at the
same time. In particular, an approved project from IN or RCN will nor-
mally provide a legal right to tax subsidies (but with an upper limit on
total support owing to European Union rules for state subsidies). We de-
fine a treatment as a sequence of consecutive firm-years with support. This
is independent of whether the support comes from one or multiple sources
in (some or all) the years in the sequence. If a firm obtains repeated
treatments, the new treatment period is, by definition, non-consecutive to
the preceding one. The upper part of Table 1 shows that in the case of
treatments with IN or RCN as the largest source of funding (columns 1–2),
SKF is an additional source of funding in 45 per cent of the treatments
(row 3). In contrast, in the case of treatments with SKF as the largest
source of funding (column 3), additional support from IN and RCN is re-
ceived in only 9 per cent and 5 per cent of the treatments, respectively
(rows 1–2). The lower part of Table 1 shows that the largest source of R&D
support accounts for 84–91 per cent of total treatment-level R&D support.
When tax credits (from SKF) are the largest source of funding, direct grants
account for an almost negligible share (0.03 + 0.04 = 0.07, i.e. 7 per
cent) of total treatment-level support. If RCN or IN is the largest source of
funding, tax credits contribute 13–14 per cent of total R&D support.
3. Operationalisations and data
Let D denote the number of years in the treatment (duration). To
measure the treatment intensity, we define the support dose as the vector
=S S S S( , , )IN RCN SKF( ) ( ) ( ) , where the component S(k) is the sum of support
from the instrument k over the whole treatment period divided by D.
The annual support data cover the period 2002–2013. These data are
merged with annual register data covering accounting variables, em-
ployment and IP for all Norwegian limited liability firms since 1995. We
will refer to these merged data as the Business Register. An additional
source of information is the R&D census. This census is mandatory for all
firms that are selected by Statistics Norway and it covers all firms in the
business sector with at least 50 employees. It commenced in 1997 as a bi-
annual survey and became annual in 2001. Among firms with 10–49
employees, a stratified random sample by two-digit NACE industry of
about 30 per cent of the population is drawn each year from the main R&
D industries (and smaller shares from the other industries). Firms with
5–9 employees are included in the census through a stratified random
sample scheme, but with more limited coverage. Regardless of size or
industry, all firms that reported significant R&D activity in the previous
census are included in subsequent ones. To supplement the regular R&D
census, we obtained questionnaire data from SKF on each applicant's R&
D expenditure for three years prior to applying for tax credits. These data
are collected by the RCN, which must approve in advance any project
that is to form the basis for tax credits (see footnote 11).
Firms that obtain support but are missing from both the annual R&D
census and the SKF questionnaire data are excluded from our estima-
tion sample. Moreover, our model set-up requires matching of the
treated firms with non-treated firms belonging to the same stratum at
the time of matching, where the matching (stratification) variables in-
clude R&D expenditure, IP applications, employment, industry (two-
digit NACE), region and firm age.
Our final matched sample is a combination of sampling from the R&
D census and the Business Register, as firms that are R&D-experienced
prior to obtaining support are matched with R&D active firms from the
R&D census sample. On the other hand, R&D-starters, i.e. firms without
R&D activity prior to treatment (according to both sources of R&D in-
formation), are matched with firms from the Business Register with no
recorded R&D activity.14
8 ‘ … (innovation support is aimed at projects with) … extensive content of
research and development activities … (contributing to) … renewal and in-
creased value creation for the firms that participate in the project, and for
Norwegian firms in general by making new knowledge and new solutions
available’ (translated from Research Council of Norway, 2019) (https://www.
forskningsradet.no/sok-om-finansiering/hvem-kan-soke-om-finansiering/
naringsliv/innovasjonsprosjekt-for-offentlig-og-naringsliv/).
9 The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) asserted that the original scheme
violated EU rules against discriminatory government subsidies.
10 Since then the limit has been increased several times. See
Benedictow et al. (2018) for details about the scheme.
11 Firms are entitled to tax credits as long as the project meets the formal
criteria and has been approved by the Skattefunn division of the Research
Council. This applies only to costs that the firms have incurred in the income
year in which the approval was granted. The tax authorities monitor the re-
ported costs and aggregate public support for the enterprise under the State Aid
Code. See Benedictow et al. (2018) for further details.
12 This share has remained remarkably stable over time (https://www.ssb.no/
teknologi-og-innovasjon/artikler-og-publikasjoner/stor-okning-i-bruk-av-
skattefunn-ordningen (in Norwegian)).
13 Table A.1 in the Appendix provides further information about the dis-
tribution of support across industries and regions. Support is highly con-
centrated in a few industries, with two-thirds of total support going to manu-
facturing (with production of chemicals as the largest two-digit NACE industry),
followed by information and communication (16 per cent) and professional and
scientific services (12 per cent). An almost negligible share of the support goes
to other industries. The distribution across regions and industries is similar
across the support schemes except that a higher share of RCN support is re-
ceived by professional and scientific services (which includes NACE 72) com-
pared with support from IN and SKF.
14 A firm in the Business Register with zero received R&D support and no
recorded R&D activity (because it is missing from the R&D survey data) is
classified as R&D inactive. According to our estimates, the probability that this is
a misclassification is less than 3 per cent. The expected downward bias in the
effect estimate (due to including potentially R&D active firms in the control
group) is negligible.
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3.1. Descriptive statistics before matching
The Business Register consists of 8834 treated firms and the total
number of treatment years is 27,224, which comprises 4362 treatment
years with support from IN, 3646 with support from RCN and 23,049
with support from SKF (note that the same firm may receive support
from several sources in the same year). We observe that the total R&D
support from the three instruments to the population of limited liability
firms is NOK 21,924 million from 2002 to 2013. This sum is split be-
tween the three instruments as follows: NOK 5014 million from IN,
NOK 6410 million from RCN and NOK 10,500 million from SKF.
Column 2 contains descriptive statistics after the merger of the Business
Register with our two sources of R&D survey data. Comparing columns
1 and 2 (the upper part of Table 2), it can be seen that having to classify
firms as either R&D-starters or R&D-experienced at the time of treat-
ment assignment reduces the number of treatment years by only 13 per
cent (from 27,224 to 23,737) and the amount of R&D support from
21,924 to 19,100 million NOK.
From the three last columns in the upper part of Table 2, we can see
that a highly disproportionate amount of R&D support is given to R&D-
experienced firms (17,717 / 23,737).15 From the lower part of Table 2,
comparing columns 1–2 with columns 3–4, we see that the mean
(median) number of employees among the treated firms is 32.1 (5.0) in
the Business Registers compared with 39.7 (7.0) in the merged data set.
The firms in the two data sets have almost identical characteristics for
all other variables: the mean (median) level of labour productivity is
0.45 (0.40) vs. 0.46 (0.41), the mean (median) return on assets (RoA) is
1 (2) per cent vs. 2 (3) per cent and the mean (median) firm age is 8.6
(5.0) vs. 9.0 (5.0) years. Of the treated firms, 12 per cent have made a
previous IP application, most commonly patents, before receiving
support (first column). In contrast, only 0.8 per cent of all firms in the
Business Register have IP applications (not displayed).
Some interesting differences with regard to the policy instruments
appear in the upper part of Table 2. First, 31 per cent of all IN support
goes to firms that are three years or younger (denoted by ‘Share with
firm age ≤ 3′), compared with 13 and 19 per cent for RCN and SKF
(column 1). These figures confirm that IN specifically targets young
firms. Perhaps surprisingly, a much higher share of support from SKF
goes to firms that were R&D-experienced prior to treatment (78 per
cent) compared with the proportions for IN (64 per cent) and RCN (59
per cent).16 These figures reflect that tax credits are rights based. In
contrast, RCN and IN choose projects based on internal evaluations of,
among other things, prospective additionality. The result is a dis-
proportional representation of (prior) R&D inactive firms compared
with the ‘pure’ self-selection that characterizes SKF.
3.2. The matched sample
The purpose of matching is to control for confounding factors, i.e.,
variables that affect both the probability of treatment and the outcome
variable, y. In our analyses, y equals either: (1) ln(Y) (log output), (2) ln
(L) (log number of employees), (3) ln(Y/L) (log labour productivity) or
(4) RoA (returns on assets). Our procedure is based on a vector of
matching variables, X, which characterises the firm prior to receiving
Fig. 1. Distribution of annual firm-level support for each policy instrument.
Notes: In millions of NOK (horizontal axis) per firm-year. The sum of the shares equals one for each instrument.
Table 1
Share of support from each policy instrument, by largest source of support.
Largest source of support of the treatment
Share of treatments supported by IN RCN SKF
IN 1.00 0.18 0.09
RCN 0.07 1.00 0.05
SKF 0.45 0.45 1.00
Share of NOK million support from
IN 0.84 0.04 0.04
RCN 0.03 0.82 0.03
SKF 0.13 0.14 0.93
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: The upper part of the table reports the share of treatments that receive
support from the given source (rows 1–3), for a given largest source of support
of the treatment (columns 1–3). The lower part (rows 4–6) reports the share of
support from each policy instrument.
15 Only 4 per cent of all firms in the Business Register received any form of R&
(footnote continued)
D support. Moreover, among firms that report positive R&D expenditure be-
tween 2002 and 2013 in the R&D census, 69 per cent received R&D support
during the same period.
16 From columns 2 and 4 (for IN, RCN and SKF): 2,636 / 4,116 = 0.64, 2,968
/ 5,067 = 0.59 and 7,722 / 9,919 = 0.78.
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treatment. We divide X into a finite number of strata, x, as follows:
=x industry region age empl rd ip( , , , , , )
where industry is the two-digit NACE industry, region refers to one of
five regions, age and empl refer to age and employment intervals, and rd
and ip are dummy variables: rd = 1 if the firm was R&D active during
the previous three years, and ip = 1 if the firm filed at least one ap-
plication for IP during this period. The firm age intervals are 0–3, 4–6,
7–9 and >9 years, and the employment intervals are: 0–4, 5–9, 10–19,
20–49, 50–99, 100–249 and >249 employees. IP comprises patents and
(industrial) designs registered at the Norwegian Patent Office.
In our study a firm is classified as R&D active if it reports positive R
&D expenditures or file one or more IP applications. Thus, firms with
ip = 1 is a subset of firms with rd = 1.17 Therefore, our matching
variables comprise indicators of the firm's prior R&D and innovation
activities, which clearly affect both firm performance and participation
in support programs. For example, without controlling for prior R&D
activity, we risk confounding the effect of conducting R&D (and, per-
haps, as a by-product, obtaining R&D support) with the effect of R&D
support itself. Note that we do not use pre-treatment R&D-intensity as a
continuous matching variable. This is partly because R&D-intensity,
conditional on rd= 1, varies a lot over time for a given firm – and much
more so than for the registry based variables. We suspect that mea-
surement errors may partly contribute to this excess variation. The
matching variables also reflect the fact that some programs target re-
gions, start-up firms and industries, which is related to firm perfor-
mance through local labour market and life-cycle conditions.
The upper panel of Table 3 shows that the final matched sample
consists of 14,007 (3455 + 10,552) treatment years, comprising NOK
11,715 (3570 + 8145) million in total R&D support, of which about 70
per cent (8145 / 11,715) is allocated to firms that were R&D active at the
time of treatment assignment (R&D-experienced). Comparing the char-
acteristics of the treated firms (R&D-starters vs. R&D-experienced) in
Tables 2 and 3 indicates that the (matched) estimation sample (the lower
part of Table 3) is representative of the population of treated firms (the
lower part of Table 2) along all dimensions of interest. This is further
illustrated in Fig. A.1 in the Appendix, which shows the distribution of the
number of employees at the year of treatment assignment before vs. after
matching (treated firms with R&D information vs. treated firms in the
matched sample). Although there is a slight tendency that the matched R&
D-starters/-experienced comprise a slightly lower/higher share of firms
with 1–5 employees compared to all treated firms, the overall picture is
that the matched sample is a representative subset of all treated firms.18
Table 2
R&D support and pre-treatment characteristics (all treated firms).
Business Register Business Register merged with R&D data1)
All R&D-starters2) R&D-experienced3)
No. of treated firms 8834 6838 2237 4601
No. of treatment-years4) 27,224 23,737 6020 17,717
# Firm-years with IN support 4362 3141 1261 1880
-Share with firm age ≤ 3 0.38 0.37 0.64 0.20
# Firm-years with RCN support 3646 3172 1063 2109
- Share with firm age ≤ 3 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.09
# Firm-years with SKF support 21,053 21,053 4802 16,251
- Share with firm age ≤ 3 0.24 0.21 0.45 0.13
Sum NOK million support
2002–2013 21,924 19,100 5776 13,300
Sum IN support 5014 4116 1479 2636
- Share with firm age ≤ 3 0.31 0.29 0.51 0.16
Sum RCN support 6410 5067 2099 2968
- Share with firm age ≤ 3 0.13 0.16 0.25 0.09
Sum SKF support 10,500 9919 2196 7722
- Share with firm age ≤3 0.19 0.18 0.41 0.03
Pre-treatment firm characteristics Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
No. of employees5) 31.2 8.0 35.8 10.0 17.4 7.0 39.7 11.0
Labour productivity5),6) 0.45 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.37 0.33 0.49 0.47
RoA 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 −0.02 0.00 0.04 0.05
Firm age 8.6 5.0 9.0 5.0 7.5 2.0 10.6 7.0
R&D-intensity7) NA NA 0.06 0.02 0 0 0.09 0.03
Previous IP appl. (0/1)8) 0.12 0 0.13 0 0.0 0.0 0.17 0.00
- Patent appl. (0/1) 0.11 0 0.11 0 0.0 0.0 0.15 0.00
- Industrial design (0/1) 0.03 0 0.04 0.03 0.0 0.0 0.06 0.00
Notes: The table reports key variables at firm-year level for all treated firms in the Business Register compared with firms in the Business Register with R&D data (at
the time of treatment assignment). The lower part of the table provides the mean and median values of key variables at firm-year level for 2002–2013. 1) The data are
from two sources: the annual R&D census and questionnaires to firms with support from SKF. 2) R&D-starters: firms without R&D activity before obtaining support. 3)
R&D-experienced: firms with R&D activity before obtaining support.4) Some firms might receive support from several sources. Thus, the total for the rows might be
larger than the number of treatment years. 5) Firms with non-zero employment 6) Output (value added) per employee in millions of NOK (NOK 100 ≈ EUR 11). 7)
Average NOK millions intramural R&D expenditures per employee over three years prior to treatment. 8) Indicator of at least one IP application.
17 Note that if a firm receives R&D support (in t), then R&D expenditure (in t)
is positive by definition, although it remains possible that the firm is R&D in-
active: rd = 0 (recall that rd, like all other components of x, refers to the
characteristics of the firm prior to treatment assignment). If so, treatment co-
incides with a transition from being R&D inactive to R&D active.
18 The representativeness of the matched sample with respect to industry and
region is generally good as shown by comparing Table A.1 (before matching)
with Table A.2 (after matching). One exception concerns firms in the R&D in-
dustry (NACE 72), some of which receive large grants from RCN and co-operate
closely with regional universities. Many treated firms in NACE 72 are not
matched because there are few non-treated firms in this industry, particularly
large ones. This is reflected in the lower shares of support after matching
(Table A.2) than before matching (Table A.1) for the (broad) industry category
professional, scientific and technical services, in which NACE 72 is included,
and for the Mid region (where the Norwegian University of Science and Tech-
nology is located).
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The reduction in the sample size in Table 3 compared with all
treated firms in Table 2 (i.e., 14,007 vs. 23,737) is the price that we pay
for a matched sample with almost perfect balancing properties with
regard to variables in levels (y, X) and in differences (Δy). From the
lower part of Table 3, we can see that the balancing properties hold for
the variables used in the matching, but also for labour productivity, R&
D-intensity and RoA.19 Perfect balancing regarding dummy or interval
variables related to IP, R&D, firm age and employment is a direct result
of the stratification. On the other hand, the almost perfect balancing
with regard to the level variables in Table 3, such as number of previous
IP applications, R&D-intensity, labour productivity, RoA and firm age,
reflects the fact that none of these (level) variables are significant
predictors of treatment assignment, conditional on the stratification
(matching). The matching variables, conversely, are highly significant
predictors of treatment assignment.20 Moreover, the assumption of a
common trend cannot be rejected for the pre-treatment differences (Δy)
for any of the dependent variables, as seen from the lower part of
Table 3.
4. Identification and estimation of treatment effects
In the classical case, treatment is represented by a binary treatment
indicator, say D. In our set-up, a treatment is represented by a
vector (Di, Si), where Di denotes the number of years in the
treatment period (duration), the subscript i denotes the firm and
=S S S S( , , )i i IN i RCN i SKF( ) ( ) ( ) , where Si(k) denotes the support dose of firm i
from the policy instrument k ∈ {IN, RCN, SKF}. As in the classical case,
=D 0i is equivalent to non-treatment.
Let yit(d) denote the outcome when the firm is assigned to the
treatment (or non-treatment) d ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} by a completely random
draw. In contrast, yit(Di) is the realized outcome, i.e., the outcome when
Di is selected by the process of application and approval described in
Section 2. The amount of the support dose, Si, is implicitly understood
as a part of the treatment. Furthermore, let Ti denote the (firm-specific)
year of treatment assignment (the firm receives support in Ti, but not in
T 1i ).21 We assume, for +T t T di i , that:
= + + +
=
( )y d f m X e d( ) 1 ( ),it i t iT
n
d




where fi is a fixed firm effect, mt( · ) is the generic notation for the (non-
parametric) common trend, XiTi refers to the characteristics of the firm
prior to Ti, τin is a fixed treatment effect that is realized in year
= +t T ni . Moreover, n ≤ d, and 1( · ) is notation for the dummy vari-
able. Then, the effect of the treatment measured one year after end of
treatment (at = +t T di ) or earlier is:
= +
=
E y d y T t T d( ( ) (0)) 1 forit it
n
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Later, we consider the effects, τin, realized during the post-treatment
years, defined as the years from + +T d 1i until the firm obtains a new
treatment or exits from the sample. If present, such effects could be
Table 3
Sample description and balancing properties (the matched sample).
R&D-starters1) R&D-experienced2)
Sample size and support Treated Control Treated Control
No. of firms 1135 68,930 3345 2954
No. of treatment years 3455 10,552
# treatment years with IN support 501 1174
# treatment years with RCN support 732 1356
# treatment years with SKF support 2771 9560
Sum NOK million support 3) 3570 8145
Sum IN support 734 1717
Sum RCN support 1580 1894
Sum SKF support 1257 4533
Balancing properties 4) Mean 5) SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Variables in levels (X):
No. of employees 22.5 3.0 19.5 2.5 32.0 5.8 30.3 5.3
Labour productivity6) 0.48 0.03 0.44 0.02 0.49 0.03 0.50 0.02
RoA 0.052 0.007 0.052 0.007 0.051 0.017 0.050 0.006
Firm age 9.7 0.7 9.4 0.8 12.0 0.5 9.2 0.4
R&D-intensity7) 0 0 0 0 0.078 0.008 0.058 0.028
Prev. IP appl. (0/1) 8) 0 0 0 0 0.064 0.005 0.063 0.006
No. of prev. IP appl. 0 0 0 0 0.193 0.030 0.201 0.030
Variables in differences (Δy):
ΔLog no. of employees 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01
ΔLog output 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.02
ΔLog labour productivity 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01
ΔRoA 0.000 0.006 −0.001 0.005 0.019 0.010 0.010 0.006
Notes: 1) R&D-starters: firms without R&D activity before obtaining support. 2) R&D-experienced: firms with R&D activity before obtaining support. 3) NOK million
support 2002–2013. 4) The matching is exact with respect to industry (two-digit NACE), region, IP applications (dummy) and the interval-valued firm age and
employment variables used in the definition of the strata (see Section 3). 5) Frequency-weighted means, with weights equal to number of treated firms in each stratum.
6) Output (value added) per employee in millions of NOK (NOK 100 ≈ EUR 11). 7) Average NOK millions intramural R&D expenditures per employee over three
years prior to matching 8) Dummy variable (indicator of at least one IP application).
19 When the reported mean values are used with the standard errors to cal-
culate 95 per cent (pairwise) confidence intervals for the treated and control
groups and separately for R&D inactive and R&D active firms and for all the
variables reported in the table, it can easily be seen that they overlap. Formal
tests of equality of means and medians are available from the authors upon re-
quest. In all cases, these tests lead to clear non-rejection. We conclude that the
matched sample has excellent balancing properties.
20 Logit estimates, available from the authors upon request, support these
statements.
21 If a firm obtains repeated treatments, the estimation of treatment effects is
based on a new matching for each treatment. Note that, by definition, a new
treatment period is non-consecutive to the preceding period.
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positive or negative. Positive effects would mean further additionality
after the support has ended. Negative effects would mean reversion to
the mean, i.e. that the potential positive effects of treatment start to
diminish after the financial stimuli has ceased.
The main objectives of the estimation are dose–response functions,
which are averages of the realized values of τin (i.e. for n ≤ Di) con-
ditional on support dose, =S Si , and pre-treatment characteristics
=[ ]X xiT strati ([X]strat denotes the stratification operator that maps X into












Duration,Di, is allowed to depend both on effect parameters
, ...,i iD1 i, support dose, S, and pre-treatment characteristics, x. For in-
stance, treatments supported (mainly) by RCN tend to have longer
durations than treatments supported (mainly) by SKF or IN (see lower
part of Table 4).
The main condition for identification is that the matching vector
consists of a sufficient number of variables to satisfy unconfoundedness
(Rubin, 1990). Define =W D S( , )i i i . Then:
( )W y d X f d t T( )| , for any {0, 1, 2, ...} and .i it iT i ii
Unconfoundedness implies that the non-treated outcome, yit(0), is
conditionally independent of the realized treatment, Wi, given the
matching vector, XiTi, and the fixed effect, fi. The inclusion of fixed
effects adds substantial flexibility as we do not need to consider the
impact of time-invariant variables that are picked up by the fixed effect
(see Arkhangelski and Imbens, 2019, for a similar approach). For ex-
ample, we might expect unobserved traits, such as management quality,
employer skills and capabilities to affect both firm performance and the
probability of treatment (see Yu et al., 2015 and Sadun et al., 2017). To
the extent that such traits are persistent, for example in the form of a
high productivity level, they will be picked up by the fixed effect. Of
course, such traits could also lead to higher than average productivity
growth. However, as shown in the lowest part of Table 3, there is no
systematic pre-treatment difference between the treatment groups and
the control groups with respect to any of the growth variables that we
consider, including labour productivity growth.
It would not be a violation of unconfoundedness if a firm has a re-
search idea and then obtains R&D support. In fact, this is exactly what
we expect to happen: projects are always approved based on ex ante
plans and ideas. However, it would be a violation if innovative projects
are carried out regardless of support and the firms in the control group
are systematically less innovative. Fortunately, innovativeness is not
completely unobserved, as firms tend to protect valuable innovations by
applying for IP (patents, industrial designs, etc.). This is the reason that
we have included a number of pre-treatment IP applications as a
Table 4
Estimated partial outcome additionalities.
Outcome variable R&D- status Age category Policy instrument
IN RCN SKF
Addit. z Addit. z Addit. z
Output (value Starters1) Start-ups3) 1.32* 1.90 0.73 0.45 3.16*** 2.74
added) (Y) Incumbents4) 1.34* 1.92 1.58 0.19 3.47*** 2.50
Experienced2) Start-ups 0.52* 1.75 −0.23 −0.33 0.65** 2.05
Incumbents –1.02 –1.55 7.85 1.13 0.56 0.88
No. of employees Starters Start-ups 0.68* 1.80 0.96 1.26 2.32*** 2.66
(L) Incumbents 1.25* 1.69 10.44 1.14 5.38*** 4.23
Experienced Start-ups 0.28 0.87 0.09 0.20 0.66** 2.08
Incumbents 0.16 0.32 0.20 0.08 1.17 1.56
Labour productivity Starters Start-ups 0.09 0.16 –0.96 –1.00 0.55 0.68
(Y/L) Incumbents 0.44 0.69 1.48 0.26 –0.73 –0.54
Experienced Start-ups –0.16 –0.51 0.29 0.58 –0.01 –0.04
Incumbents –1.31 –2.01 10.03 1.27 –0.43 –0.70
Return on assets Starters Start-ups –0.02 –0.01 –3.42** –2.04 –0.12 –0.25
(RoA) Incumbents 1.79** 2.35 –3.75 –0.66 –1.77 –1.23
Experienced Start-ups 0.10 0.47 0.40 0.53 –0.22 –0.43
Incumbents –13.73 –1.09 –0.25 –0.03 –1.85** –2.14
Mean support dose Starters Start-ups 1.8 (0.3, 2.6) 2.3 (0.6, 3.3) 0.5 (0.2. 1.0)
(interquartile range Incumbents 1.1 (0.2, 1.5) 1.0 (0.3, 1.5) 0.4 (0.1, 0.6)
in parentheses) 5) Experienced Start-ups 1.8 (0.4, 1.9) 2.5 (1.1, 3.1) 0.6 (0.2, 0.8)
Incumbents 1.7 (0.6, 2.0) 1.5 (0.5, 1.8) 0.5 (0.2, 0.7)
Share of support to Starters Start-ups 0.30 0.28 0.17
Incumbents 0.06 0.13 0.05
Experienced Start-ups 0.26 0.22 0.23
Incumbents 0.38 0.37 0.55
Sum 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean (median) Starters Start-ups 2.3 (1) 4.9 (4) 3.0 (2)
duration6) Incumbents 1.6 (1) 2.6 (2) 2.4 (2)
Experienced Start-ups 3.3 (3) 5.2 (4) 3.2 (2)
Incumbents 2.2 (1) 4.1 (3) 2.8 (2)
Notes: The table reports the estimated average partial outcome additionalities (Addit.) (for output, number of employees, labour productivity and RoA), by policy
instrument, R&D-status prior to support, and age category in the year of treatment assignment. The given policy instrument is considered the marginal source of
funding. For outcomes Y and L, Addit. represents, respectively, additional NOK mill. output/no. of employees per NOK 1 mill. of support. For outcomes Y/L and RoA,
Addit. represents, respectively, increase in labour productivity/return on assets per NOK 1 mill. in support per employee/per NOK mill. asset. The symbols ***, **
and * denote significant estimates at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 1) R&D-starters: firms without R&D activity before obtaining support. 2) R&D-experienced: firms
with R&D activity before obtaining support.3) Firm age ≤ 3 at the start of the treatment period (therefore the share of support to start-up firms is higher than the
share of support to the category “Share with firm age ≤3″ in Table 2). 4) Firm age >3 at the start of the treatment period. 5) Mean support dose (i.e. sum of NOK
million support from the given instrument divided by no. of years in the treatment period), with interquartile range in parentheses (conditional on dose>0) 6) Mean
(median) duration of the treatment (no. of years) when the given instrument is the largest source of support of the treatment.




We define the cell C(x, T) as the set of firms in the stratum x at time
T. The subset of firms in this cell that are assigned to treatment at T
(i.e., firms with Ti= T) is denoted by NT(x). The corresponding control
group, MT(x), is a subset of non-treated firms in C(x, T).22 All firms in
cell C(x, T) that are assigned to treatment at T will have the same
control group (many-to-many matching) regardless of the realized
treatment.23
To estimate τ(x)(S), we apply a regression formulation of the mat-
ched difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator (see Lechner, 2010).24
First, we insert the expression for τ(x)(S) into Eq. (1). Second, we dif-
ference to eliminate the fixed effect and obtain:
= + +
< +
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The equation is estimated on the sample consisting of all matched
firms (treated and controls) across the cells C(x, T).
The notation mt(x, T) underscores that the common trend is specific
for the cell C(x, T), i.e. Δmt(x, T) is non-parametrically identified as a
cell-specific time effect. It is important that Δmt(x, T) does not depend
on variables that may be affected by the treatment, such as con-
temporaneous R&D or employment. Current endogenous variables are
‘bad controls’. Therefore, our control variables are used for stratifica-
tion (matching) only. Moreover, to identify the effect of the same
treatment over time, the matching must be kept the same; otherwise,
the estimated common trend would depend on the outcome of the
treatment.
Our approach is in line with Lechner (2010) and Lechner and
Wunsch (2013), who stress the importance of the balancing properties
of the matched sample. Like us, they do not include control variables in
the DiD part of the estimation, using them only for matching purposes.
If the matched sample is balanced, there is no need for additional
control variables.25
In contrast to the completely flexible, non-parametric common
trend, in the interest of parsimony, the dose-response function τ(x)(S) is
allowed to depend on just two components of x (implicitly aggregating
over the other components): (1) start-up firms, defined as firms that are
less than three years of age (counted from the date of incorporation) at
the start of the treatment vs. incumbent firms and (2) firms that have
reported positive ex ante R&D activity before treatment (R&D-experi-
enced) vs. firms that with no such activity (R&D-starters).
4.2. Dose–response analysis
From a program evaluation perspective, the amount of support
provided by a public agency is highly relevant (see Baum and
Cerulli, 2016). Therefore, we explore a dose–response association be-
tween a (continuous) public support exposure and the associated out-
come, as explained above. We allow the effects to be non-linear and
incorporate a full set of interactions between the three policy instru-
ments. We follow Baum and Cerulli (2016) and Hottenrott and
Lawson (2017) and specify the dose–response function defined in
Eq. (3) as a polynomial. Our most general specification is a polynomial
of the third order, but with interaction terms restricted to be of the
second order:
= + + +
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where the summation is over k ∈ {IN, RCN, SKF} and (τk(x), τkk(x), τkl(x),
τkkk(x)) are parameters to be estimated for a given x.26
Two special cases are of interest: (1) the instrument (k) has no effect
on the outcome variable and (2) all the instruments are perfect sub-
stitutes, which means that the total sum of the support dose, Sk k( ), is
what matters, not the instrument mixture. Both special cases amount to
testable restrictions on the parameters.
When reporting results in Section 5, we will typically be interested
in the level variables, e.g. output (Y), while the dependent variable is on
logarithmic scale, =y Yln( ). Thus, the dose–response function in
Eq. (4) must be transformed into a level effect, which we denote by τL(x)
(S). From Eq. (1):
=
= =( )Y d Y Y Y( ) (0) (0) exp( 1 ) 1 (0) 1it it it n
d
in n t Ti it n
d
in n t Ti1 ( ) 1 ( )
Thus
22 In principle, any non-treated firm in C(x, T) could be in the control group
MT(x). Some additional details are in order here. First, a non-treated firm could
potentially belong to several control groups (one for each T). We assign a firm
to a (unique) control group according to a rule that attempts to balance the
ratio of the number of treated firms to the number of control firms across cells.
Second, we do not exclude firms from potentially being in a control group until
they obtain treatment (if ever) because such exclusions would depend on future
outcomes of endogenous variables (e.g., future R&D) and therefore violate the
conditional independence assumption.
23 The principle that the control group is independent of the realized treat-
ment also applies to propensity score matching with multiple treatments. A
common practice is to match a unit (i) that obtains a specific treatment (k) with
a non-treated firm with the same probability of the chosen alternative, πk(xi).
Unfortunately, as shown by Lechner (2001), this strategy does not lead to a
balanced distribution of x in the matched sample, even if the assumption of
unconfoundedness holds. To be valid, the matching should be conducted with
respect to the vector =x x x( ) ( ( ), ..., ( ))i i K i1 involving all the potential treat-
ments to ensure it is independent of the realized treatment. A consequence is
that propensity score matching may not be simpler than covariate matching
with multiple treatments. In fact, it could be more complicated and more de-
pendent on ad hoc functional form assumptions.
24 There is an ongoing debate in the literature as to whether one would
benefit from combining DiD and matching; see for instance Blundell and Costa
Dias (2009), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Lechner (2010) and (2015).
We emphasize the argument of Blundell and Costa Dias that ‘the combination of
matching with DiD as proposed in Heckman et al. (1997) can accommodate
unobserved determinants of the non-treated outcome affecting participation for
as long as these are constant over time’ (2009, p. 604).
25 We estimate the regression equation using xtmixed in STATA on the mat-
ched sample of N treated firms and M controls, where the Δmt( · ) are specified
as random cell-specific time effects. Weights and robust (clustered) standard
errors are specified. The weights are =w 1i if i ∈ NT(x) and
=w M N x N M x# ( )/( # ( ))i T T if i ∈ MT(x) ( A# denotes the number of elements in
the set A). The random effect specification is justified if XiT and Di are in-
dependent in the matched sample. Unfortunately, even if stratification achieves
independence of XiT and Di within each cell, this does not necessarily extend to
the matched sample if the ratio of treated to controls varies across the cells. The
weighting corrects this imbalance: =w N x M N/# ( ) /j MT x j T( ) , i.e., the number
of weighted controls per treated firm isM/N in each cell and, as a result, the total
number of weighted controls is M (as in the unweighted sample).
26 Because the dose–response function is linear in parameters, it is a
straightforward matter to accommodate heterogeneous coefficients. Then, τk(x)
can be considered as a weighted average over treatment-specific parameters
that capture both unobserved firm characteristics, e.g., the dose relative to the
size of the underlying R&D project and the duration of the treatment.
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We apply the Duan smearing formula (Duan, 1983) to obtain a further
improved approximation and the delta method to obtain standard er-
rors.
A causal interpretation of the dose-response function requires that
support dose, Si, is exogenous given treatment (e.g., see
Guardabascio and Ventura, 2014). In our application, this is likely.
First, tax credits are approved independently of the outcomes – pro-
spective or realized – of the supported projects. Second, grants from
RCN or IN are based on evaluations (often external) that lead to a
binary decision: approval or not. If approved, the size of the grant is
under normal circumstances fixed throughout the project period and
depend on the type of program (regional, industry-wide, en-
trepreneurial, etc.) and its budgetary constraints. According to our
sources at RCN and IN, the size of a grant is rarely determined by
ranking the successful applicants. Of course, this does not preclude the
possibility that projects may be terminated owing to breach of contract,
or that continued support may be contingent on certain outcomes.27
This is not necessarily a problem in our model. For example, if a project
supported by NOK 1 million per year in three years is extended by one
year, the support dose (support per year of treatment) would still be
NOK 1 million.
5. Estimation results
5.1. The dose–response function
In the first part of the results presentation, we will focus on the
outcome variables of output and number of employees (we present
results pertaining to labour productivity and RoA in the next subsec-
tion). From a policy perspective, the estimand of main interest is the
effect of a given amount of support on the level of these variables, for
example, what is the additional output (Y) or additional number of
employees (L) generated per NOK 1 million of support?
We focus first on the effect of partially varying the dose of the k'th
component of S, S(k). Let τL(x)(S(k), · ) denote τL(x)(S) as a function S(k),
for any fixed level of the other components (as indicated by ‘ · ‘). We
furthermore define the k'th partial dose–response as:
S( , ·) (0, ·)L x k L x( ) ( ) ( )
The k'th partial dose–response considers the k'th instrument as the
marginal source of funding, with the level of support from the other
sources taken as given. This may be a realistic description from the
perspective of the public agencies. First, in most cases of funding by
SKF, this agency is the only and obviously, therefore, the marginal
source of funding (see Table 1). Second, in the case of co-funding from
SKF, on the one hand, and IN or RCN on the other hand, the latter is the
marginal source because the project would qualify for tax credits re-
gardless of direct support. Third, as shown in Table 1, there are very
few cases with support from all three sources.
Figs. 2 and 3 show estimates of average partial dose–responses for R
&D-starters and R&D-experienced firms (prior to support), respectively.
Each figure is obtained by setting, for k ∈ {IN, RCN, SKF}, the other
components of S equal to their empirical values and then averaging
over all treatments in the relevant subpopulation (indicated by x). Each
figure contains two panels, with results for start-up firms ( ≤ 3 years) in
the upper panel and incumbent firms in the lower panel. Each of the 6
separate graphs in each panel corresponds to a combination of one of
two outcome variables, output (column 1) or employment (column 2),
and one of the three policy instruments (IN, RCN or SKF) (in row 1 – 3).
From Figs. 2 and 3, we first note that the distribution of dose differs
dramatically between SKF, on the one hand, and IN and RCN on the
other. In the figures, this is indicated by the three vertical (dashed) lines
showing the interquartile range and the mean dose (the solid line) for
each combination of main instrument and firm group. We see that the
typical dose (annual support) for SKF lies between NOK 0.2 and 0.5
million (interquartile range), compared with NOK 0.5–2.0 million for
both RCN and IN (recall that the support dose refers to support per firm-
year of treatment). Furthermore, while the interquartile range for SKF is
very similar for the three groups of firms, both RCN and IN seemingly
prioritize young firms over incumbents, especially incumbent R&D-
starters.28 About 10 per cent of total grants and 5 per cent of total tax
credits go to the latter group (see lower part of Table 4).
There are some notable results in Figs. 2 and 3. First, the dose–r-
esponses of R&D-starters are generally significant and positive, with the
exception of RCN. Second, R&D support does not seem to generate
positive additionality for R&D-experienced firms, except for support
from SKF above the mean dose (about NOK 0.5 million). Third, the
effect of support is decreasing on the margin, as the level of support per
firm-year (dose) increases. Fourth, the 95 per cent confidence intervals
(the vertical line segments) are rather wide. Nevertheless, the clear
impression is that the additionality, i.e., the generated increase in the
outcome variable, is rapidly decreasing on the margin as the dose in-
creases. This seems to be the main reason why the results for SKF are
generally more positive than those for IN and RCN.
Three tests regarding the dose–response functions in Eq. (4) are
presented in Table A.3 for two outcome variables presented in Figs. 2
and 3. The first column in the table tests the hypothesis that all in-
struments have zero effect (H0) for each category of firms. There are
two unambiguous results. First, in the case of R&D-starters that are
three years or younger at treatment assignment (start-ups), we clearly
reject H0 (p-value<0.0001). Second, in the case of R&D-incumbents,
we clearly do not reject H0. In the second column of the table, we test
whether the instruments are perfect substitutes within each firm cate-
gory. The implication of this hypothesis is that, for a given x, only the
amount of support matters, not the instrument per se. In general, the
hypothesis is not rejected, implying that if we control for pre-treatment
characteristics (x) and the amount of support (S), no instrument is
better or worse than others in terms of dose–response. Of course, as we
have seen in Table 2, the different instruments do select systematically
different projects with regard to observed pre-treatment characteristics
(x) and provide very different support doses (S). Therefore, non-rejec-
tion does not necessarily imply that all the instruments are ‘equally
good’, only that there is no selection of projects based on unobserved
characteristics that systematically produces different outcomes. Finally,
the third column tests the hypothesis that there are no second- or third-
order terms in the polynomial dose–response function. This hypothesis
is clearly rejected in all cases where zero effects of all the instruments
are also rejected. Thus, the dose–response polynomial cannot be re-
duced to a linear function.
5.2. Additionality
The ideal way to assess the effectiveness of the R&D support
schemes might be through a cost–benefit analysis taking into account
all direct effects, spillover effects, administrative costs and the oppor-
tunity costs of inputs used in production. However, to assess spillover
effects requires a structural analysis, which is beyond the ambition of
this paper. The indications from previous studies using Norwegian data
27 In the cases of RCN and IN, most support is decided in advance and locked
in in the form of two- or three-year contracts. Premature cancellations are
unusual.
28 It should not come as a surprise that the mean or median incumbent firm
with no R&D history receives less annual support than do R&D inactive start-
ups. In general, it is a well-established government policy that youth, ceteris
paribus, is an advantage in the competition for research funds, especially in the
absence of previous R&D-related output.
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Fig. 2. R&D-starters: Estimated partial dose–response functions in levels.
Notes: The figures show the estimated partial dose–response functions in levels, by outcome (output, no. of employees), instrument (IN, RCN, SKF), and age category
(start-ups, incumbents) for R&D-starters: R&D inactive firms prior to the support. Dose is defined as the sum of support from the given instrument divided by the
duration of the treatment period. Vertical line segments indicate confidence intervals. The mean and the interquartile range of the support dose are indicated,
respectively, by the solid vertical line and the pair of dashed vertical lines.
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Fig. 3. R&D-experienced: Estimated partial dose–response functions in levels.
Notes: The figures show the estimated partial dose–response functions in levels, by outcome (output, no. of employees), instrument (IN, RCN, SKF) and age category
(start-ups, incumbents) for R&D-experienced: R&D active firms prior to the support. Dose is defined as the sum of support from the given instrument divided by the
duration of the treatment period. Vertical line segments indicate confidence intervals. The mean and the interquartile range of the support dose are indicated,
respectively, by the solid vertical line and the pair of dashed vertical lines.
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are that any spillovers are difficult to detect and, notwithstanding,
difficult to attribute to specific policy instruments.29 Our less ambitious
approach, therefore, is to show that our dose–response framework is
well suited to estimating familiar measures of additionality related to R
&D support (see Mohnen (2018) for a discussion of different concepts of
additionality).
We first consider output (value added) as the outcome variable.
Dropping the subscript i, let = + +Y Y D Y( ) ( ) (0)T D T D denote the ad-
ditional output (the ‘marginal effect’) generated by total support
×D Sk k( ) (=duration × aggregate dose) over the treatment period.















where the expectation is over the given subpopulation, defined in terms
of x = (industry, region, age, empl, rd, ip). Output additionality is an
expression for the average additional output per NOK 1 million of ag-
gregate support. The right-hand side of the equation shows that output
additionality can be calculated directly from the dose–response func-
tion.
We are more interested in the effect of a given instrument than in
the aggregate support from all instruments. For this purpose, we define
Δ(k)(Y) as the additional output (marginal effect) of a partial increase in
the support from the k'th instrument from zero to S(k) × D. Then, the
additionality when the k'th policy instrument is considered the marginal




















i.e., the numerator on the right-hand side equals the k'th partial do-
se–response and the denominator equals the corresponding dose.
The upper part of Table 4 shows the estimated partial additionalities
corresponding to output (Y) and the number of employees (L). As ex-
plained above, these estimates are based on transformations of do-
se–response functions on a logarithmic scale (e.g., in the case of output,
the dependent variable is =y Yln( )). Focusing first on R&D-starters, we
see that the estimated additional output (the value added in NOK
millions) per NOK 1 million in support from IN (SKF) is 1.32 (3.16) for
start-up firms and 1.34 (3.47) for incumbent firms. The estimates of the
additional number of employees per NOK 1 million in support from IN
(SKF) are 0.68 (2.32) for start-up firms and 1.25 (5.38) for incumbent
firms. The estimates for SKF are significant at the 1 per cent level,
whereas the estimates for IN are significant only at the 10 per cent or
higher level. Neither of the estimates related to support from RCN are
significant. Turning to the results regarding R&D-experienced firms, we
see that the estimated additionalities are either insignificant or much
lower than for R&D-starters. Consistent with the tests reported in
Table A.3, there are no significant estimates at the 10 per cent level for
R&D-incumbents, whereas the highest significant estimate at the 10 per
cent level is 0.66 for R&D-experienced start-ups.
The middle part of Table 4 shows estimates of additionality for la-
bour productivity (Y/L) (obtained by transforming the dose–response
function of =y Y Lln( / ) and RoA). In these two cases, the outcome
variable is a ratio, and we measure the support relative to the pre-
treatment value of the denominator (L or K), rather than the (NOK
million) support. What is shown in the table is the average increase in
labour productivity per 1 NOK million in support per employee and the
average increase in RoA per NOK 1 million in support per asset (book
value, in NOK millions). Regarding labour productivity, none of these
are estimates significant at the 10 per cent level, whereas the estimates
for RoA are insignificant at the 10 per cent level, except for three cases,
of which two are negative. These latter results show that support does
not improve the productivity or profitability of the supported firms.
To summarize our results regarding additionality, public R&D sup-
port generates significant output and employment additionality among
R&D-starters. These firms obtain 30 per cent of all R&D support to
business enterprises.30 On the other hand, there are no significant re-
sults for R&D-incumbents, which obtain 65 per cent of the support.31
The results for the (residual) group of R&D-experienced start-ups are
mixed, but this group obtains only 5 percent of total support. None of
the instruments improve labour productivity or the RoA. The most
striking finding is perhaps that—despite their active management of
project portfolios at considerable administrative costs—neither IN nor
the RCN generate more value added or employment relative to the
amount of direct support than SKF does relative to the amount of tax
credits. However, the generally higher and more significant addition-
ality estimates for SKF compared with the other instruments do not
necessarily mean that SKF is a ‘better’ instrument than IN or RCN. In
fact, the higher additionality can be explained entirely by the de-
creasing returns to support dose, which was illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3
and corroborated by the test results in Table A.3. Moreover, the higher
additionality of SKF compared with IN and RCN is restricted to R&D-
starters, and the share of support to such firms is much lower for SKF
(22 per cent) compared with IN (36 per cent) and RCN (41 per cent), as
seen from the lower part of Table 4 (cf. also Table 2).32 Because SKF is a
rights-based instrument, in contrast to IN and RCN, it cannot target the
category of firms that are mostly affected by R&D subsidies.
5.3. Post-treatment effects
So far, we have only considered the effects of the treatments that are
realized within one year of the last year of support ( +T di ). If the
duration of the treatment is long enough, this may be enough time for
the effects to appear. However, given that a firm is not assigned to a
new treatment, we may expect additional post-treatment effects in the
forms of: (1) (positive) delayed effects and (2) (negative) mean rever-
sion effects owing to the removal of the financial support. The net effect
is indeterminate.
In contrast to the analyses above, we now consider the post-treat-
ment years, i.e. the years from + +T d 1i until the firm obtains a new
treatment or exits from the sample. Specifically, we will examine the 3-
year post-treatment period from + +T d 1i until + +T d 3i .33 Extending
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29 Møen (2007) investigates spillovers that occur through labour mobility of R
&D personnel, but finds no evidence that the personnel earn higher wages
compared with a control group with similar experience, education, etc. More-
over, spin-off firms from the subsidized firms tend to perform worse than does a
control group. However, in a related article, Møen (2005) finds moderate evi-
dence of spillovers occurring through labour mobility between R&D-intensive
firms. However, the latter article does not specifically address spillovers from
publicly supported R&D.
30 =5, 766/19, 100 0.30 (see columns 2-4 in Table 2).
31 × =0.70 0.93 0.65, where 0.70 is the estimated share of support to R&D
experienced firms relative to all firms (13, 300/19, 100) (see columns 2-4 in
Table 2) and 0.93 is the estimated share of support to R&D-incumbents relative
to all R&D-experienced: 1 minus a weighted average of 0.16 for IN (about 25
per cent weight), 0.09 for RCN (about 25 per cent weight) and 0.03 for SKF
(about 50 per cent weight); see column 4 in Table 2.
32 From Share of support in Table 4, we have 0.30 + 0.06 = 0.36 (IN),
0.28 + 0.13 = 0.41 (RCN) and 0.17 + 0.05 = 0.22 (SKF).
33 The choice of three years is motivated by Table A.4 which shows that 3 is
the median number of post-treatment years in the sample. That is, at least 50
percent of all treatments can be followed for three post-treatment years. The
longer the duration of the treatment, the fewer are the available post-treatment
years that can be analysed.
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where the second sum refers to the 3-year post-treatment period. To
obtain identification, we need to condition on no new treatment in the
post-treatment period, as we cannot otherwise disentangle the effects of
the new and previous treatments. A corresponding post-treatment do-













Table 5 presents estimates for the average post-treatment ad-
ditionality. It is analogous to Table 4, but restricted to output and
employment additionality. There are no significant estimates in
Table 5, which indicate that the effects of R&D support are completely
realized within one year of the end of the treatment. In addition, the
results in Table 5 indicate that the gains achieved during the treatment
period are not reversed over the next three years.34 Thus, it is inter-
esting to see that there are no additional effects after the treatment is
finished, but neither are there any reversals. This result indicates that
positive effects, if any, have a lasting impact on firm performance and
that support does not merely give a transitory boost.
6. Concluding remarks
R&D investment is considered to be one of the main drivers of
technological progress and economic growth. However, owing to
market failures, there is ample support among policymakers and aca-
demics for increased public R&D expenditure. In many countries, in-
cluding Norway, there are several co-existing and potentially com-
plementary support schemes. We analyse all the major instruments for
R&D support to firms in the business enterprise sector in Norway: the
innovation-oriented policies of IN, the instruments of RCN and the R&D
tax incentive scheme, SKF. Although the targeted firms and the design
and magnitude of support are somewhat different, all three are in-
tended to promote product or technology innovations. We consider R&
D support as a multivariate dose exposure, allowing any mixture of
support from the three instruments, and estimate dose–response func-
tions on a sample of treated firms matched with a control group. Our
data contain detailed accounting, employment and IP information from
public registers, as well as information about R&D activity prior to
obtaining support from two survey datasets. In particular, pre-treat-
ment R&D is an important confounding factor. If we do not include this
as a matching variable, our estimates of economic additionality become
much higher.
The findings indicate the following. First, the estimated dose–r-
esponses are positive and (statistically) significant mostly in the case of
Table 5
Estimated post-treatment partial outcome additionalities.
Outcome variable
Output (Y) No. of employees (L)
R&D status Policy
instrument
Addit. 95% Conf. Addit. 95% Conf.
Starters1) IN −0.2 −4.3 4.1 0.5 −1.6 2.3
RCN −5.9 −28.1 17.1 5.8 −5.2 16.8
SKF 3.0 −2.8 8.8 0.7 −3.1 4.4
Experienced2 IN −0.5 −3.1 2.0 −0.1 −1.6 1.6
RCN 3.3 −4.5 10.0 −2.8 −11.7 6.0
SKF 0.3 −2.9 3.2 −0.6 −2.6 1.5
Notes: The table reports estimated post-treatment additionalities (Addit.) (for
number of employees and output), by policy instrument and R&D-status prior to
support. It reports the mean additional NOK mill. output (Y) and no. of em-
ployees (L) over the three post-treatment years per NOK 1 million of support. The
given policy instrument is considered the marginal source of funding. The 95
per cent confidence intervals of Addit. is abbreviated 95% Conf. The symbols
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 1) R&D-
starters: firms without R&D activity before obtaining support. 2) R&D-experi-
enced: firms with R&D activity before obtaining support.
Table A.1
Percentage of R&D support, by broad industry and region. Before matching.
Source of support
Industry IN RCN SKF All
Primary industries 5.4 0.8 3.4 3.1
Mining, oil and gas extraction 0.4 2.2 0.9 1.2
Power prod., waste and recycling 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.3
Manufacturing 32.1 34.5 31.0 32.3
-Textiles and food 6.9 2.1 5.2 4.6
-Wood, pulp and paper 1.7 1.1 1.9 1.6
-Chemicals, pharma., rubber and plastics 4.1 4.6 3.3 3.9
-Metals and minerals 6.8 7.9 4.6 6.1
-Machinery and electronics 12.6 18.9 16.0 16.1
Construction 1.1 1.0 2.0 1.5
Wholesale and retail trade 5.5 1.9 8.1 5.7
Transportation and storage 1.2 1.6 1.1 1.3
Information and communication 20.8 12.6 27.0 21.4
Real estate activities 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5
Professional, scientific and technical services 29.5 37.4 21.6 27.9
Other services 2.6 5.9 2.9 3.7
Sum of all industries 100 100 100 100
Region
South 2.7 5.2 5.6 5.5
Capital (Oslo)/greater capital area 59.7 52.2 52.7 56.6
West 24.5 27.7 27.4 24.7
Mid 11.4 10.2 10.7 6.7
North 1.6 4.7 3.5 6.6
Sum 100 100 100 100
Table A.2
Percentage of R&D support and firm-years, by broad industry and region. After
matching.
Source of support Firm-
years
Industry IN RCN SKF All
Primary industries 5.2 1.1 3.8 3.4 1.6
Mining, oil and gas extraction 0.8 1.8 1.0 1.1 0.5
Power prod., waste and recycling 1.0 2.0 1.6 1.6 0.9
Manufacturing 32.5 26.2 31.8 30.3 6.0
-Textiles and food 6.6 1.3 4.9 4.2 1.1
-Wood, pulp and paper 1.7 0.7 1.7 1.4 1.1
-Chemicals, pharma., rubber and plastics 4.1 5.7 4.1 4.6 0.4
-Metals and minerals 5.7 4.2 5.1 5.0 1.2
-Machinery and electronics 14.3 14.3 16.0 15.1 2.2
Construction 0.8 0.5 1.8 1.2 11.3
Wholesale and retail trade 5.3 2.3 7.5 5.5 19.0
Transportation and storage 1.4 0.9 1.1 1.1 4.1
Information and communication 16.7 8.2 25.2 18.3 4.1
Real estate activities 3.8 0.3 0.8 1.3 22.9
Professional, scientific and technical
services
27.2 51.7 21.6 31.7 10.8
Other services 5.3 5.0 3.6 4.4 18.0
Sum industries 100 100 100 100 100
Region
South 9 2 5 5 6
Capital/greater Oslo area 41 46 49 46 53
West 33 23 28 28 26
Mid 10 25 11 15 8
North 7 5 6 6 8
Sum regions 100 100 100 100 100
34 As a supplementary analysis, we examined whether there are any differ-
ences in the post-treatment effects of treatments with durations exceeding three
years vs. shorter durations. However, we found no interesting patterns or sig-
nificant differences in the results between the two groups. These results are not
shown, but are available from the authors on request.
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R&D-starters (i.e. firms without R&D activity prior to receiving sup-
port), but insignificant in the case of R&D-incumbents (R&D active,
incumbent firms prior to receiving support). Second, our estimates are
significantly positive only for outcome variables related to output and
employment, but insignificant with respect to labour productivity and
RoA. Third, the dose–response is decreasing on the margin, causing a
decreasing return to a higher support dose. Fourth, direct support from
IN and RCN generate less additionality than does SKF per NOK million
in support, despite active selection and management of projects, espe-
cially large ones, by IN and RCN. Given the mentioned result of de-
creasing returns to support, the comparatively positive effects regarding
SKF seem to be due to their lower levels of support dose, rather than to
specific characteristics of indirect vs. direct support. That is, notwith-
standing active portfolio management, large projects do not appear to
pay off.
Our analyses have strong policy implications: when economic
additionality is of importance, policymakers should design R&D policy
instruments in favour of R&D-starters, that is, shifting the focus from
the intensive to the extensive margin. For other purposes, such as
supporting regular R&D performers, it should be on the basis that the
project will have positive spillovers, e.g. in the form of non-proprietary
technology which may be beneficial to third parties.
There are issues not addressed that could to be explored in future
work. First, we cannot observe whether the firms perform basic re-
search or more development-type projects. Such heterogeneity may
lead to different outcomes, and therefore, ideally, should be analysed
separately. A second issue could be to look more into firms that can be
followed over repeated treatments, or over longer post-treatment per-
iods than we have done (i.e. three years). In any case, our multivariate
dose-response framework can be applied, as it is quite flexible with
regard to handling different sources and durations of support, as well as
repeated support.
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Table A.3
Tests of parameter restrictions in dose–response function: p-values of χ2- statistics.
Outcome variable R&D-status Age category p-value of testing the hypothesis (H0):
All instruments have zero effect1) All instruments are perfect substitutes2) No higher order terms in polynomial 3)
Output (value Starters4) Start-ups6) 0.000 0.145 0.000
added) Incumbents7) 0.103 0.252 0.432
Experienced5) Start-ups 0.035 0.827 0.000
Incumbents 0.117 0.577 0.290
No. of employees Starters Start-ups 0.000 0.407 0.000
Incumbents 0.000 0.878 0.000
Experienced Start-ups 0.000 0.000 0.000
Incumbents 0.076 0.054 0.090
Notes: See Eq. (4). 1) Test of =( , , , ) 0k x kk x kl x kkk x( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for all k, k> l (11 degrees of freedom) 2) Test of = = = =, , , 0k x l x kk x ll x kkk x lll x kl x( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for all k> l (8
df.) 3) Test of = = =0, 0, 0kk x kkk x kl x( ) ( ) ( ) for all k≠ l (8 df.). 4) R&D-starters: firms without R&D activity before obtaining support. 5) R&D-experienced: firms with R
&D activity before obtaining support. 6) Firm age ≤ 3 at the start of the treatment period. 7) Firm age >3 at the start of the treatment period.
Table A4
The number of post-treatment years.
Duration of
treatment








1 0.57 3 0.25
2 0.53 3 0.49
3 0.52 3 0.64
4 0.52 3 0.74
5 0.42 2 0.82
6 0.38 1 0.87
7 0.30 1 0.91
8 0.19 0 0.93
9 0.00 0 0.95
10 0.00 0 0.97
11 0.00 0 0.99
12 0.00 0 0.99
13 0.00 0 1.00
Notes: The post-treatment years start at the second, subsequent year after the
end of treatment. For instance, if the treatment ends in 2009, the post-treatment
years are the years from 2011 until the firm exits from the sample or obtains a
new treatment.
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